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Abstract
Recently in Australia, the interchange fees on shared ATM transactions were removed and replaced
by a fee directly set and received by the ATM owner (“direct charging scheme”). We develop a model
to study how the entry of independent ATM deployers (IADS) affects welfare under the direct charging
scheme. Paradoxically, we show that the entry of IADS benefits banks ! It is also good for consumers if
they sufficiently value the ATMs deployed by the independent deployers.
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1 Introduction
In Australia, the way cardholders are charged for using ATMs that are not owned by their bank (foreign
ATM transactions) has changed since 3 March 2009: consumers have to pay a usage fee to the owner of the
ATM. The “direct charging reform” was initiated by the Australian reserve bank to replace another pricing
scheme where each foreign ATM transaction was involving the payment of two fees: a foreign fee, paid by
the cardholder to its own bank, and an interchange fee, paid by the cardholder’s bank to the owner of the
ATM. In the new system these two fees disappear.
According to the proponents of the reform (see Reserve Bank of Australia and the Australian Competition
and Consumer Commission, 2000), there were several problems attached to the previous pricing scheme: first
consumers were sometimes ill informed about the price of foreign ATM transactions. Second interchange
fees were bilaterally negotiated between card issuers and acquirers and the regulator feared insufficient price
flexibility and competition in the market for foreign ATM transactions. The regulator also feared that banks
could pass a high level of the interchange fee on retail prices of bank services. By replacing interchange
fees and foreign fees by fees that are directly and non-cooperatively charged by the ATM owner on shared
transactions, the regulator wants to promote prices more in line with costs, encourage ATM deployment in
areas where there is no ATM, and make pricing more transparent.
In a previous paper (2009), we study how switching from a pricing regime with interchange fees and
foreign fees to a regime with direct charging affects ATM deployment, consumer welfare and banks’ profits.
We consider two horizontally differentiated banks and show that direct charging boosts ATM deployment.
To understand why, note that under direct charging, bank i can use the fee si it charges to the other
bank’s cardholders to enlarge its deposit market share: by increasing si, bank i makes it less interesting
for customers to join the other bank since their foreign withdrawals become more expansive. This effect is
known as the depositor stealing effect. Here, each bank sets ATM usage fees above the level they would
choose if they considered ATMs separately from the deposit market. In turn these high ATM usage fees
make it more profitable for banks to process foreign withdrawals than under the regime with interchange fees
and foreign fees. As a consequence banks deploy more ATMs under the direct charging regime in order to
process more foreign withdrawals. We show that this effect is so strong that banks deploy too many ATMs:
their profits are negatively affected.1 Consumers benefit from switching to direct charging if travel costs are
1Interestingly, on average American banks lose money on their ATM operations and they outsource their ATMs. Although
the American ATM pricing scheme (interchange fee, foreign fees and surcharges) and the new Australian pricing scheme are
not the same, they are formally equivalent (see Salop (1990), Croft and Spencer (2005), Donze and Dubec (2009), Chioveanu,
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high enough. In this case they enjoy the larger ATM network even if accessing cash is more expansive. They
are worse off if travel costs to reach cash are low. In this case, they prefer the smaller but less expansive
network of the regime with interchange fees and foreign fees.
In this paper, we examine how introducing independent ATM deployers (IADs) affects banks’ profitability
and consumer welfare under direct charging. We show that paradoxically, increasing the number of IADs
benefits banks ! In fact the entry of IADs reduces the amplitude of the depositor stealing effect because the
machines they deploy are accessible to all cardholders under the same conditions: the difference in the size
of the ATM networks of the two banks becomes a less important differentiator and banks deploy less ATMs.
In turn their profits increase. If consumers sufficiently value the ATMs deployed by IADs, we show that
their surplus and the total welfare increase.
Our analysis is related to previous works. Salop (1990) proposes the direct-charging scheme as a mean
of self regulation for the ATM market. He argues that this scheme should lead to a larger ATM deployment
than the scheme with interchanges fees and foreign fees. However he does not consider the interactions
between the deposit and the withdrawal markets. Massoud and Berhnardt (2002) identify the depositor
stealing effect of ATM usage fees. We extend their analysis by endogeneizing the ATM deployment and
introducing IADs.
The paper is organized as follows. In the section two, we set up the model. In section three, we consider
the benchmark case in which these is no IAD. In section four, we consider the case with banks and IADs.
Section five concludes.
2 The model
There are 2 banks denoted by i ∈ {1, 2} located at the two ends of a product space [0, 1]. A mass one of
consumers of banking services are distributed uniformly along this product space. There are d independent
ATM deployers denoted by k ∈ {1, ..., d}.
Banks and IADS
Bank i provides its cardholders with basic banking services and the access to its ni free-to-use ATMs in
exchange of an account price pi. The marginal cost of providing the basic services is constant and normalized
to zero. IADs do not have cardholders and just provide ATM services. The number of ATMs operated by
Fauli-Oller, Sandonis and Santamaria (2009)).
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IAD k is denoted by n̂k. The cost of deploying and operating an ATM is the same for banks and IADs and
is denoted by c. The marginal cost of processing a withdrawal is normalized to zero.
We consider the following ATM direct-charging scheme:
• There is no interchange fee.
• A cardholder of bank i must pay an ATM usage fee sj to bank j for each withdrawal made at one of
bank j’s ATMs.
• To use an ATM operated by IAD k, the cardholders of the two banks must pay an ATM usage fee ŝk
to k.
Hence, we consider the common case where each bank discriminates between its own cardholders and
those of its competitor for ATM usage. On the contrary, IADS do not discriminate between the cardholders
of the two banks.
Consumers
They have a reservation utility equal to zero. A customer who becomes a cardholder of bank i located
at a distance δi in the product space obtains a total surplus equal to:
wi = vb − tδi + vi − pi (1)
The term vb represents the fixed surplus from consuming basic services. The second term tδi is a differenti-
ation cost in the product space (where t > 0). To guarantee the existence of a solution it must be the case
that t is sufficiently large. The term vi corresponds to the variable net surplus from consuming withdrawals.
More precisely,
vi = ui(ni, nj , n̂1, ...n̂d, qii , q
j
i , q̂
1, ...q̂d)− sjqji −
d∑
k=1
ŝkq̂
k (2)
where qii is the number of withdrawals made by a cardholder of bank i using bank i’s ATMs, q
j
i is the
number of withdrawals made by this cardholder using bank j’s ATMs (with j 6= i), and q̂k is the number
of withdrawals made by this cardholder using IAD k’s ATMs. Note we have dropped subscript i because
the cardholders of the two banks make the same number of withdrawals using the ATMs of IAD k. We set
a simple surplus function ui to generate individual demands for withdrawals in which the two influencing
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factors are the ATM market shares of banks and the fee consumers have to pay to use its machines.
ui =
1
β
(qii −
n
2αni
(qii)
2) +
1
β
(qji −
n
2αnj
(qji )
2) +
d∑
k=1
1
β̂
(q̂k − n
2α̂n̂k
(q̂k)2) (3)
Differentiating the surplus function with respect to qii , q
j
i and q̂
k we obtain the demands for withdrawals of
a cardholder of bank i. This cardholder makes qii withdrawals using bank i’s ATM:
qii = α
ni
n
(4)
and qji using bank j’s machines:
qji = α
nj
n
(1− βsj) (5)
and q̂k withdrawals using IAD k’s machines:
q̂k = α̂
n̂k
n
(1− β̂ŝk) (6)
The demand for withdrawals faced by each deployer (bank or IAD) is increasing in its ATM market
share but decreasing in the usage fee cardholders have to pay. Remind that banks do not charge their own
cardholders for ATM usage. For tractability, we have ignored price substitution effects: when a competitor
of bank i decreases its usage fee, the demand faced by bank i is not affected.
Plugging expressions (4), (5) and (6) into (3), we obtain the expression of the optimized surplus:
vi =
1
2
α
β
ni
n
+
1
2
α
β
nj
n
(1− βsj)2 + 12
k=d∑
k=1
α̂
β̂
n̂k
n
(1− β̂ŝk)2 (7)
Demands and profits
We deal with cases where the market for deposits is entirely covered. Let δ denote the distance between
bank 1 and the consumer who is equally off between purchasing services from bank 1 or 2:
v1 − tδ − p1 = v2 − t(1− δ)− p2 (8)
We obtain the following deposit market size of bank i
Di =
1
2
+
1
2t
(vi − vj − pi + pj) (9)
Note that the presence of IADs does not affect consumers’ decision where to bank: vi − vj depends neither
on the IADs’ deployment nor on their usage fees.
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The profit of bank i can be written
pii = piDi + siqij(1−Di)− cni (10)
The first part of the profit corresponds to the net revenues from selling banking services. The second part
of the profit corresponds to the revenues coming from the withdrawals that bank j’s cardholders make at
bank i’s machines. The profit of IAD k is
pik = ŝkq̂k − cn̂k (11)
In this expression, revenues come from a mass one of cardholders making each q̂k withdrawals at k’s IADs.
Timing of the game
First, banks and IADs choose the number of ATMs they deploy and prices simultaneously. Second
consumers choose their banks and withdraw cash.
3 The case without independent ATM deployer
It is convenient to start with the determination of the account fee. Setting ∂pii/∂pi = 0 and the symmetric
condition for bank j, we obtain
p∗i = t+ siq
i
j (12)
The account fee is the sum of the differentiation parameter and the cost for bank i of accepting an extra
consumer. It is actually an opportunity cost corresponding to the revenues that bank i would obtain if the
consumer chose to become a cardholder of bank j, making qij withdrawals at i’s ATMs.
Let us determine usage fees. The first order condition is ∂pii/∂si = 0 or
(pi − siqij)
∂Di
∂si
+
(
si
∂qij
∂si
+ qij
)
(1−Di) = 0 (13)
The first term measures the effect of modifying si on bank i’s deposit market share: by increasing si, bank
i becomes more attractive for consumers because they want to avoid costly foreign withdrawals. Its deposit
market share increases. The second term is the effect of modifying si on the revenues coming from foreign
withdrawals.
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We determine equilibrium deployment: we have ∂pii/∂ni = 0 or
(pi − siqij)
∂Di
∂ni
+ si
∂qij
∂ni
(1−Di) = c (14)
The first term states that by deploying new ATMs, bank i attracts extra depositors. To highlight the
properties of the equilibrium, we first consider the following hypothetical case:
No depositor stealing effect. We study what would happen if banks did not take into account the effect of
modifying their network size or their ATM usage fees on the deposit market: we set ∂Di/∂ni = ∂Di/∂si = 0.
The results are established in appendix 1 and given in table 1.2
With the depositor stealing effect. We now take into account the spillovers between the markets. Here
a bank can increase its deposit market share either by setting a higher ATM usage fee, si or by deploying
more machines. The results are established in appendix 1 and given in table 1.
n∗ p∗ s∗ CS BS TS
no stealing effect 116
α
β
1
c t+
α
8β
1
2β
3
16
α
β
3
16
α
β
3
8
α
β
with stealing effect 518
α
β
1
c t+
α
9β
2
3β
1
6
α
β − 118 αβ 19 αβ
Table 1: comparison of surplus with and
without depositor stealing effect
The results are summarized in the following proposition :
Proposition 1 The existence of the depositor stealing effect makes banks deploy much more ATMs, set
lower account fees but higher ATM usages fees compared to the hypothetical situation where this effect is
neutralized. The existence of the depositor stealing effect negatively affects banks’ profits, consumer surplus,
and total surplus.
Hence, direct charging, by linking the deposit market and the withdrawal market, makes banks deploy
many ATMs which negatively affects their profits and total surplus. We show in the next section that the
entry of IADs on the ATM market diminishes the importance of the stealing effect, by enlarging consumers’
choice. This in turn makes banks deploy less ATMs which is good for their profits and in most cases good
for total welfare.
2In what follows, the surplus of the indifferent consumer is written net of vb − 3t2 . Similarly banks’ profits are also written
net of t.
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4 Effects of independent deployers entry on banks’ profitability
and consumer welfare
We now assume that IADS are present in the market: d > 0. We first study the equilibria of the game for a
given d and then study how welfare is affected as IADS enter the market.
4.1 Typology of the equilibria for a fixed number of IADs
We look for the Nash equilibrium of the game. Solving the maximization problem in prices yields the same
results as under the case with no IAD: p∗i = t + siq
i
j and s
∗
i =
2
3β . We solve the maximization problem of
IAD k. It is convenient to start with determination of the ATM usage fees. The first order condition is
∂pik/∂ŝk = 0 which yields ŝ∗k =
1
2β̂
. Note that s∗i > ŝ
∗
k even when β is equal to β̂: contrary to banks, IADs
do not use the ATM usage fee as a way to steal depositors from their competitors. Let us finally consider
the deployment problem. In appendix 2, we verify there are three types of equilibria. They are detailed in
the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Suppose d ≥ 1. There are three possible types of equilibria according to the values of αβ and
α̂
β̂
.
• Zone 1: α̂
β̂
≤ 109 αβ . Only banks deploy ATMs: n∗ = 5α18β 1c ; n
∗
i
n∗ =
1
2 . p
∗
i = t+
α
9β .
• Zone 2: 109 αβ < α̂β̂ <
4
3
d
d−1
α
β . Both banks and IADs deploy ATMs:
n∗ = d+5
4d β̂α̂+18
β
α
1
c .
n∗i
n∗ =
6dαβ− 92 (d−1) α̂β̂
2dαβ+9
α̂
β̂
, n̂
∗
i
n∗ =
9 α̂
β̂
−10αβ
2dαβ+9
α̂
β̂
. p∗i = t+
2α
9β
n∗i
n∗
• Zone 3: 43 dd−1 αβ ≤ α̂β̂ . Only IADs deploy ATMs: n∗ =
1
4
d−1
d
α̂
β̂
1
c ,
n̂∗k
n∗ =
1
d . p
∗
1 = p
∗
2 = t.
The three zones appear in figure 1. When α̂
β̂
is low compared to αβ , IADs are too disadvantaged compared
to banks to deploy ATMs: we are back to the case of section 3. When α̂
β̂
takes intermediate values, both
banks and IADs deploy ATMs. When α̂
β̂
is high compared to αβ , banks do not deploy ATMs and they just
produce basic banking services.
[Insert figure 1 approximatively here]
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4.2 Effect of IADs’ entry on profits and welfare
We now study how consumer surplus and bank profits are modified as the number of IADs increases. We
have to distinguish three cases. The results are established in appendix 3.
(i) Suppose that α̂
β̂
≤ 109 αβ . We are in zone 1. In this case IADs do not deploy any ATM and hence consumer
surplus and bank profits are not affected as the number of IADs, d, increases. We have BS = −118
α
β , CS =
1
6
α
β ,
TS = 19
α
β .
(ii) Suppose that 109
α
β <
α̂
β̂
< 43
α
β . We are in zone 2, for any d. As new independent deployers enter the
market, the total number of ATMs increases. Banks’ ATM market share decreases but remains positive. At
the same time, bank surplus (expression (15)) increases.
BS =
α
β
(6αβ − 92 α
′
β′ +
9
2
α′
β′
1
d )(
8
9
α
β − α
′
β′ − α
′
β′
1
d )
(2αβ + 9
α̂
β̂
1
d )
2
(15)
It comes from the fact that banks deploy less and less ATMs as the entry of IADS makes it less profitable
for banks to differentiate using ATM deployment. IADs surplus is equal to
IADS =
α̂
β̂
(9 α̂
β̂
− 10αβ )2
(2αβ + 9
α̂
β̂
1
d )
2
(16)
and increases and then decreases. Consumer surplus is equal to
CS =
α
β
n∗i
n∗
(
1
3
+
d
18
) +
d
8
(
α̂
β̂
− 4
3
α
β
) (17)
CS is a decreasing function of b. This is the result of two opposite effects: consumers make more foreign
withdrawals, but on average these foreign withdrawals are cheaper because they are increasingly made using
the ATMs of the independent deployers. The first effect dominates the second so that consumer surplus falls.
Nevertheless one should note two things: first the decrease is weak: the limit value of consumer surplus as
d → ∞ cannot be below 23/24 of its value when d = 0 (equal to α/6β). Second the decrease of consumer
surplus is even weaker when α̂
β̂
is close to 43
α
β : in this case consumers more highly value the new ATMs
deployed by IADS as d increases. We can verify that consumer surplus is constant for α̂
β̂
= 43
α
β . The effect
on total surplus is ambiguous:
- it decreases if 109
α
β <
α̂
β̂
≤ 3227 αβ . In this case the fall of consumer surplus outweighs the rise of banks’
surplus. Nevertheless this decrease is very weak: the limit value of total surplus as d→∞ cannot be
below 15/16 of its value when d = 0 (equal to α/6β).
- it increases if 3227
α
β <
α̂
β̂
≤ 43 αβ . Here the rise of banks’ surplus outweighs the fall of consumer surplus.
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(iii) Suppose that 43
α
β ≤ α̂β̂ . Let us define d˜ by
d˜ =
α̂
β̂
α̂
β̂
− 43 αβ
For a number of IADs d < d˜, we are in zone two of proposition 2. For d ≥ d˜ we are in the zone three of
proposition 2. As independent deployers enter the market, more and more ATMs are deployed but banks’
ATM market share decreases and reaches zero when d ≥ d˜. Consumer surplus (expression (17)) first increases
when d varies from zero to d˜ and thereafter becomes constant and equal to 18
α̂
β̂
. This is due to the fact that
the cheap but highly valued machines deployed by independent deployers gradually replace the machines
deployed by banks. Banks’ profits (expression (15)) increases from d = 0 to d˜ and then becomes equal to
zero: banks gradually give up ATM activities to focus on the production of basic services. IADs’ profits first
increase and then decrease. Total surplus increases from d = 0 to d˜ and decreases.
We sum up the main results in proposition 3 and table 2.
Proposition 3 The entry of IADs mitigates the deposit stealing effect which increases banks’ profits. If
consumers attach a sufficiently high value to the ATMs of the independent deployers, both consumer surplus
and total welfare increase.
Zone CS BS IADS TS
α̂
β̂
≤ 109 αβ (1) −→ −→ −→ −→
10
9
α
β <
α̂
β̂
< 3227
α
β (2) ↘ ↗ ↗↘ ↘
α̂
β̂
= 3227
α
β (2) −→ ↗ ↗↘ ↗
32
27
α
β <
α̂
β̂
< 43
α
β (2) ↗ ↗ ↗↘ ↗
4
3
α
β ≤ α̂β̂ (2) then (3) ↗ −→ ↗ −→ ↗↘ ↗↘
Table 2: variation of consumer surplus, banks’ surplus, IADs’
surplus and total surplus as the number of IADs increases.
5 Conclusion
In Donze and Dubec (2009), we showed that ATM direct charging, by boosting deployment, makes con-
sumers better off in the case of high travel costs but places a burden on bank’s profitability. In this article
we have shown that the entry of independent ATM deployers, while possibly leaving consumers slightly
worst off, permits to limit banks’ use of ATM deployment as a way to steal depositors from competitors.
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Therefore encouraging the existence of independent deployers on the ATM market can be an interesting way
to reestablish banks’ profitability under direct charging without hurting consumers too much.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1 : Proof of proposition 1
We start with the situation without stealing effect (∂Di/∂ni = ∂Di/∂si = 0), expression (13) becomes
−1
2
αβsi
ni
n
+
1
2
qij = 0⇒ s∗i =
1
2β
(18)
and (14) gives
1
8
α
β
n− ni
n2
= c⇒ n∗ = 1
16
α
β
1
c
(19)
We consider the situation with the depositor stealing effect. Using expressions (2) and (9) one can write
∂Di
∂si
= − 1
2t
∂vj
∂si
= − 1
2t
(
∂uj
∂qij
∂qij
∂si
− qij − si)
∂qij
∂si
. (20)
However ∂uj/∂q
f
j = fj + si so that ∂vj/∂si = −qfj . Hence we have
∂Di
∂si
=
1
2t
qij . (21)
Using expressions (12) and (21), one can rewrite (13) as
1
2
qij −
1
2
αβsi
ni
n
+
1
2
qij = 0⇒ s∗i =
2
3β
(22)
Furthermore, we have
∂Di
∂ni
=
1
2t
∂(vi − vj)
∂ni
=
(sym eq)
2
9t
α
β
1
n
(23)
Expression (12) and (14) gives
2
9
α
β
1
n
+
1
9
α
β
n− ni
n2
= c⇒ n∗ = 5
18
α
β
1
c
(24)
Let us verify the second order condition, we have
H =

∂2pii/∂n
2
i ∂
2pii/∂ni∂pi ∂
2pii/∂ni∂si
∂2pii/∂ni∂pi ∂
2pii/∂p
2
i ∂
2pii/∂pi∂si
∂2pii/∂ni∂si ∂
2pii/∂pi∂si ∂
2pii/∂s
2
i

=

− 49 αβ 1n2 − 881t
(
α
β
)2
n−ni
n3
1
3t
α
β
1
n − 19t αβ nin2 127t α
2
β
ni
n2 +
1
27t
α2
β
(ni)
2
n3
1
3t
α
β
1
n − 19t αβ nin2 − 1t 0
1
27t
α2
β
ni
n2 +
1
27t
α2
β
(ni)
2
n3 0 α
ni
n
(
α
9t
ni
n − 32β
)

12
Det(H11) = − 49 αβ 1n2 − 881t
(
α
β
)2
n−ni
n3 < 0.
Det(H22) = + 181α
36tβn2−αn2−2nαni−αn2i
t2β2n4 > 0 if t sufficiently large.
Det(H33) = + 1162α
2 ni
t2βn5
(
14nαni − 108tβn2 + 3αn2 + 3αn2i
)
< 0 if t sufficiently large.
Appendix 2 Proof of proposition 2
The problem of maximization has two types of solutions: interior or corner. We have ∂pii/∂ni ≤ 0 and
∂pik/∂n̂k ≤ 0 for any i and k:
α
9β
(3− ni
n
)n−1 − c ≤ 0 (25)
and
α̂
4β̂
(1− n̂k
n
)n−1 − c ≤ 0 (26)
We first look for (interior) solutions where the two first order conditions are satisfied with equalities. We
have
α
9β
(3− ni
n
) =
α̂
4β̂
(1− n̂k
n
) (27)
However n = 2ni + dn̂k or 2nin + d
n̂k
n = 1. Plugging this last equality in (27), we obtain
n∗i
n∗
=
6dαβ − 92 (d− 1) α̂β̂
2dαβ + 9
α̂
β̂
(28)
and
n̂∗k
n∗
=
9 α̂
β̂
− 10αβ
2dαβ + 9
α̂
β̂
(29)
Plugging (28) in (25) we obtain
n∗ =
d+ 5
4d β̂α̂ + 18
β
α
1
c
(30)
For the solution to exist, one must have n
∗
i
n∗ ≥ 0 and n̂
∗
k
n̂∗ ≥ 0 or equivalently 109 αβ ≤ α̂β̂ ≤
4
3
d
d−1
α
β .
Suppose α̂
β̂
≤ 109 αβ , we obtain the following corner solution n̂
∗
k
n̂∗ = 0 and
n∗i
n∗ =
1
2 . Condition (25) is satisfied
with equality while condition (26) is satisfied with inequality, we obtain n∗ = 518
α
β
1
c .
Suppose 43
d
d−1
α
β ≤ α̂β̂ , we obtain the following corner solution
n̂∗k
n̂∗ =
1
d and
n∗i
n∗ = 0. Condition (25) is
satisfied with inequality while condition (26) is satisfied with equality, we obtain n∗ = 14
d−1
d
α̂
β̂
1
c .
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Appendix 3.
Let us assume that 109
α
β <
α̂
β̂
< 43
d
d−1
α
β .
(i) Variation of CS.
The expression of the surplus of the indifferent consumer is
CS =
α
β
n∗i
n∗
(
1
3
+
d
18
) +
d
8
(
α̂
β̂
− 4
3
α
β
) (31)
=
2
(
α
β
)2
+ 98
(
α̂
β̂
)2
− 114 αβ α̂β̂ +
3
2
α
β
α̂
β̂
1
d
2αβ +
9
8
α̂
β̂
1
d
Differentiating with respect to 1/d, we obtain
dCS
d(1/d)
=
−15 α̂
β̂
(αβ − 34 α̂β̂ )(
α
β − 910 α̂β̂ )
(2αβ +
9
8
α̂
β̂
1
d )
2
(32)
As by assumption αβ <
9
10
α̂
β̂
, expression (32) is positive if αβ >
3
4
α̂
β̂
. In this case CS is increasing in 1/d,
that is, decreasing in d. Expression (32) is negative if αβ <
3
4
α̂
β̂
In this case CS is decreasing in 1/d, that is,
increasing in d.
(ii) Proof that limb→∞ CS(b) ≥ 2324CS(0).
Using (31) we have
lim
b→∞
CS(b) =
α
β
+
9
16
(
α̂
β̂
)2
β
α
− 11
8
α̂
β̂
(33)
Let us minimize this function in α̂
β̂
. We obtain α̂
β̂
= 119
α
β (∈
[
10
9
α
β ,
4
3
α
β
]
). The value of expression (33) for
α̂
β̂
= 119
α
β is
23
144
α
β . Hence
lim
b→∞
CS(b) ≥ 23
144
α
β
=
23
24
CS(0) (34)
(iii) Proof that BS is an increasing function of d.
The expression of banks’ surplus is
BS(d) =
α
β
(6αβ − 92 α̂β̂ +
9
2
α̂
β̂
1
d )(
8
9
α
β − α̂β̂ −
α̂
β̂
1
d )
(2αβ + 9
α̂
β̂
1
d )
2
Differentiating with respect to 1/d, we obtain
dBS
d(1/d)
= −α
β
α̂
β̂
(10αβ − 9 α̂β̂ )2
(2αβ + 9
α̂
β̂
1
d )
3
which is negative: BS is a decreasing function of 1/d and, hence an increasing function of d.
(iv) Variation of IADS
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The expression of IADs’ surplus is
IADS(d) =
α̂
β̂
d(9 α̂
β̂
− 10αβ )2
(4dαβ + 18
α̂
β̂
)2
(iv) Variation of TS
The expression of total surplus is
TS =
28
3 (
α
β )
2 + 274 (
α̂
β̂
)2 − αβ α̂β̂ (
31
2 − 2d )
4αβ + 18
α̂
β̂
1
d
Differentiating with respect to 1/d, we obtain
dTS
d(1/d)
=
243
2
α̂
β̂
( α̂
β̂
− 109 αβ )
(
32
27
α
β − α̂β̂
)
(4αβ + 18
α̂
β̂
1
d )
2
We are in the case where α̂
β̂
− 109 αβ > 0. Hence dTSd(1/d) > 0 if 3227 αβ − α̂β̂ > 0: TS is decreasing in d if
α̂
β̂
< 3227
α
β
and increasing in d if α̂
β̂
> 3227
α
β .
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